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Introduction 
 
Since nearly the inception of the U.S., the country has maintained an imperial relationship with 
Latin America. Early U.S. leaders envisioned the Western Hemisphere as their unique sphere of 
influence and believed it was their God-given responsibility to safeguard the region from 
European influence and intervene when necessary to ensure that Latin American leaders behaved 
correctly, a policy enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 (Go 2011; Grandin 2006; 
McPherson 2016). Though U.S. leaders cloaked their imperial behavior in the language of anti-
colonial solidarity, the U.S. practiced formal colonialism in Cuba and Puerto Rico, among other 
places, and dispatched U.S. Marines to continually invade and occupy regional lands, illustrating 
the tenuous reality of territorial sovereignty (Grandin 2006; Mann 2013; McPherson 2016). The 
use of formal colonialism, however, dissipated after World War II, and, although the U.S. has 
continued to use military force and to provide aid for particular militaries throughout Latin 
America, U.S. imperial strategies have taken alternate forms since the days of the Monroe 
Doctrine. 
  
U.S. imperial ambitions in the region have long contained a mix of objectives, and we can assort 
and examine these objectives and the strategies used to achieve them, utilizing the IEMP social 
power framework designed by Michael Mann, with the acronym referring to ideological, 
economic, military, and political forms of power. According to Mann (1986, 2013), the exercise 
of social power involves multiple bases, and no one group or state agency necessarily possesses 
control over all bases of power. Some groups can effectively wield power in one realm in order 
to ultimately exercise domination in another realm. Military members, for instance, have at times 
mobilized their arms capabilities to overthrow existing governments and capture political power. 
Some political leaders have sought to garner control over economic resources as a result of their 
institutional position, and vice versa. As a result, Mann (1986, 2013) points out that various 
crystallizations of power can emerge, and, depending on the conjuncture, groups with an 
inordinate share of one set of resources can use them to dominate society writ large. 
 
In the contemporary world, Mann (2013) sees globalization as characterized by the extension of 
these four forms of power into the broader world. Indeed, although imperialism has long been a 
feature of modernity, it too has taken on different forms in Latin America at the turn of the 21st 
century. Yet, we can still analyze and assess U.S. foreign policy objectives and strategies along 
these same four lines. First, at the ideological level, the U.S. has long championed a liberal 
democratic vision of how societies should operate (Bulmer-Thomas 2018; Go 2011; Immerman 
2010). These ideas are rooted in the writings of politicians and thinkers such as John Locke, 
Thomas Jefferson, and Adam Smith. Despite the realities of who and what governments U.S. 
leaders have actually promoted, they have at least rhetorically embraced a vision that champions 
individual rights, civil liberties, and freedom from government intervention. This involves free-
market economic policies, but it is not entirely reducible to it. For instance, it also involves a 
strong emphasis on freedoms of speech and religion, and the right to bear arms. It is an 
encompassing view of how societies should operate. 
 
Second, economic objectives exist, and have surely often shaped and sometimes determined the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, economic objectives sometimes directly clash with 
broader ideological visions of what the U.S. allegedly stands for, including current U.S. 
 
 
diplomatic support for the Saudi monarchy. U.S leaders have remained interested in economic 
issues, such as the assurance of loan collection, expropriations of U.S. business, the creation of 
markets for U.S. products, and access to labor and resources. Broadly speaking, U.S. leaders 
have wanted to ensure that Latin American leaders service their loans, respect U.S. property, and 
allow entry into its markets and access to cheap labor and resources. Such interests have at times 
lent themselves to the usage of force or, Mann’s third base, military power. Even before the Cold 
War, Marines routinely invaded and occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua to 
ensure that U.S. property was respected, loans were repaid, and, in the instance of Nicaragua, 
that they did not build an interoceanic canal with the British (McPherson 2016). U.S. force, 
though, has also been deployed for additional reasons, such as to ostensibly stop Serbian forces 
from ethnically cleansing Kosovar Albanians and to capture terrorist groups responsible for the 
9/11 attacks on the U.S.  
 
Finally, on the political end, U.S. administrations have continually demanded that Latin 
American leaders broadly align with the U.S. and its national security interests before the 
interests of any other country. For example, when former Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz 
as well as the Sandinista government in Nicaragua began to work with the Soviet Union, U.S. 
leaders sought to overthrow these governments (Go 2011; Grandin 2006; Mann 2013; 
McPherson 2016). Both Arbenz and the Sandinistas took control over formerly U.S.-owned 
industries. However, they were far from the only governments during the 20th century to exert 
such control. The Venezuelan government took control over the oil industry in the 1976, and the 
Bolivian government nationalized mining and tin industries in 1952. The difference, however, 
lay in how they cast these takeovers, and how extensive their ties with the Soviet Union were. 
While the latter governments did not align with the Soviet Union and explicitly made their 
allegiance with the U.S. clear, Arbenz and the Sandinistas embraced a more radical form of 
politics and explicitly insisted on their autonomy from the U.S.  
 
In more recent years, concerns with socialism/communism have broadly given way to concerns 
with terrorism. Yet, since the turn of the 21st century, Latin American citizens have elected 
several leaders who have once again embraced socialism and challenged U.S. hegemony. 
Though there has been an ebb and flow of such leaders coming to power over the last two 
decades, we have seen them elected in places as diverse as Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. The most outspoken and controversial set of such leaders has emerged in 
Venezuela. Though some statespeople in the aforementioned countries have criticized neoliberal 
capitalism, no set of leaders has more directly confronted the U.S. than former President Hugo 
Chávez (1999-2013) and now Nicolás Maduro (2013- ). Beginning with Chávez, the Venezuelan 
government limited military relations with the U.S., condemned the War on Terror, sought 
control over several formerly U.S.-owned businesses, aligned with U.S. foes such as China and 
Russia, and routinely portrayed the U.S. as bent on undermining its socialist revolution. 
 
There is no question that recent U.S. administrations have opposed the Chávez and Maduro 
governments. Indeed, Bush II, Obama, and Trump not only opposed the Venezuelan government 
but also worked to destabilize Chávez and Maduro, and bring right-wing opposition groups into 
power, who have generally embraced the U.S. as a hegemonic power as well as its liberal 
democratic vision (Clement 2005; Cole 2017; Gill 2019; Golinger 2006). These tactics have 
evolved over the years and changed to fit existing circumstances on the ground. Under Trump, 
 
 
however, the U.S. has explicitly greenlit military efforts to overthrow the socialists and shown 
support for other undemocratic measures. He has also clearly found willingness among 
contemporary opposition leaders, such as Juan Guaidó and Leopoldo López, to embrace such 
interventionist policies.  
 
The Bush II and Obama administrations surely supported right-wing opposition parties and civil 
society groups, and regularly denounced Venezuela, sanctioned the government, and, in the 
instance of Obama, labeled the country a national security threat. Yet, Obama opened several 
avenues of dialogue and never openly supported military efforts to depose the government. This 
is not to suggest that the Obama administration never covertly encouraged a coup d’état, but only 
that such displays were not customary. Allegations certainly persist that the Bush II 
administration encouraged the 2002 coup d’état that deposed Chávez for several days, but a U.S. 
congressional inquiry found that this was not the case (OIG 2002). The key difference between 
these early administrations and the Trump administration is how bluntly Trump has sought to 
assist in the overthrow of the Venezuelan government by military force and how intensively his 
administration is willing to use economic strategies to destroy an already devastated country.  
 
In the space below, we further detail these imperial policies, describing how the U.S. has aligned 
with right-wing parties and civil society groups and, at times, dissident military members to 
depose the Venezuelan government. Similar to Mann (1986, 2013), we break these strategies 
down by their ideological, economic, military, and political content, in order to show the range 
of tactics deployed by successive U.S. administrations. Lastly, we conclude by discussing the 
outstanding question of why these efforts have failed in Venezuela. We argue that China and 
Russia have played active roles in aligning with Venezuela. In doing so, these governments have 
provided crucial economic and military support, and, for many years, they have ensured that U.S. 
moves to isolate the country have not had as deleterious effects as they might have otherwise. 
We also argue that Chávez and to a much lesser extent Maduro have received support from many 
segments of the Venezuelan populace. Chávez himself was routinely elected in generally free 
and fair elections. Maduro clearly secured victory following Chávez’s death in 2013. As the 
economic crisis has intensified, though, Maduro has taken a heavy-handed approach to ensuring 
he remains in power, including banning some of his opponents from running for office, enacting 
onerous new registration requirements, and sidelining citizens’ ability to recall him from power. 
Likewise, he has also faced increasingly diminishing levels of support from Venezuelans. 
 
 
U.S. Imperialism: Coercion and Beyond 
 
U.S. leaders have long understood Latin America as “the backyard” of the U.S. and have 
embraced the Monroe Doctrine up until the present: a paternalistic approach to the region 
premised upon U.S. primacy and the ability to intervene when desired (Bulmer-Thomas 2018; 
Go 2011; Grandin 2006). Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson even explicitly referenced this 
policy in a speech delivered at the University of Texas-Austin in February 2018. In the space 
below, we recount the types of strategies used by recent administrations with an eye towards how 
these strategies have intensified or not, in order to draw out the differences between 
administrations. We begin with economic strategies, and thereafter move into ideological, 
military, and political strategies. 
 
 
 
 
Economic Strategies 
 
Throughout the course of the Bush II and Obama administrations, economic relations between 
the U.S. and Venezuela remained unchanged in some ways. Venezuelan oil continued to flow 
into the U.S., and many U.S.-based corporations continued to profit from economic endeavors 
within the country. Yet, some serious changes did ensue. Chávez exerted greater control over the 
oil industry; expropriated some businesses and nationalized some industries; and sought to 
diversify the country’s economic relations away from the U.S. On all three counts, the 
Venezuelan government initially succeeded: it received more revenue from oil ventures, took 
over many businesses and industries, and established stronger relations with countries all 
throughout the world, but namely China and Russia.  
 
These moves infuriated domestic and U.S. political and economic elites. Given that under 
Chávez, Venezuela became a donor instead of recipient nation, though, the U.S. could not use 
any of the leverage it has traditionally exerted through bilateral economic assistance programs or 
through international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank, and the multilateral aid it has provided to some countries. Indeed, these are two 
mechanisms through which the U.S. has historically sought to alter the political-economic 
landscape in countries abroad (Bulmer-Thomas 2018; Mann 2013). Alongside disbursement of 
economic assistance, the U.S. – on its own or through IFIs – has conditioned assistance on 
reforms, namely privatization, trade liberalization, and other neoliberal policies (Harvey 2007).  
 
If the U.S. could not directly alter political-economic policies within Venezuela, though, it could 
seek to limit the economic influence of Venezuela abroad. Though the Venezuelan economy is 
now in shambles, Venezuela initially provided an alternative model for many Latin American 
countries in the region seeking autonomy from U.S. domination. Following Chávez’s success at 
the ballot box and following his success in developing social programs, several Latin American 
leaders emerged who took clear influence from Chávez, including Evo Morales in Bolivia and 
Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Outside of Venezuela, Chávez also sought to project power and 
influence. In doing so, the country initiated several development programs focused on countries 
within the Western Hemisphere, including with, for example, PetroCaribe, a program which has 
offered low-interest, subsidized oil to allied countries, such as Grenada, Haiti, and Nicaragua 
(Smilde and Gill 2013).  
 
Under Obama, for instance, former Vice President Joe Biden explicitly discouraged hemispheric 
nations from entering into such economic relationships with the Chávez government. In 2015, he 
told a group of leaders from fourteen Caribbean countries in a thinly veiled reference to 
Venezuela that “no country should be able to use natural resources as a tool of coercion against 
any other country” (White House 2015). U.S. leaders, however, realized there was little they 
could due to stop small and poor countries within the region from accepting subsidized oil and 
aligning with Chávez. What is more, though, administrations previous to Trump never pursued 
the heights of the sanctions we see today. The Obama administration did, however, take steps 
towards formally identifying Venezuela and President Maduro as adversaries of the U.S. In 
2015, Obama signed an executive order declaring Venezuela a threat to national security citing 
 
 
human rights abuses, persecution of political opposition, and public corruption for this 
designation. Additionally, seven state members were sanctioned due to their ties to violence and 
political oppression. 
 
Although Obama set the stage for economic sanctions against Venezuelan state members, the 
Trump administration has greatly accelerated their usage and intensity. At earlier moments, there 
was continual reference from both Chávez/Maduro and U.S. leaders concerning whether oil 
would ever be cut off from the country. Such a strategy, however, was never pursued under 
Obama and Bush II. Under Trump, however, the U.S. has initiated a policy of “maximum 
pressure” to depose Maduro. Most intensively, the U.S. has banned the government from 
profiting from any sales of products to the U.S. Given that the Venezuelan government controls 
its oil industry, this means that only those U.S. corporations that have received waivers from the 
country have been allowed to continue operating there. As a result, the government has been 
unable to send oil to the U.S. in order to acquire foreign exchange. Such a move has been 
economically disastrous for the country as it faces an existing economic crisis. This is not to 
suggest that U.S. sanctions caused the current crisis. However, it is true that such a move has 
limited the earnings of the government, limited access to foreign exchange, and contributed to 
hyperinflation. 
 
Finally, while the U.S. has banned economic transactions with the Venezuelan government, it 
has also sought to pressure foreign governments to cut their ties with the country, including 
Russia and China. In the last year, the U.S. imposed sanctions on a joint Russian-Venezuelan 
state company owned bank (Evrofinance), as well as a Russian energy trading company 
(Rosneft), as these units facilitated the trade of Venezuelan oil. As a result, the Russian 
government itself has purchased Rosneft’s oil stakes in direct confrontation with the U.S. and set 
up a new company named Roszarubezhneft. In addition, the U.S. has targeted China in order to 
further bottleneck the trade of Venezuelan oil. Namely, the U.S. has warned that sanctions on 
Chinese companies purchasing Venezuelan oil are on the table. All of this, of course, comes as 
the U.S. has engaged in an ongoing trade war. 
 
 
Ideological Strategies 
 
As a result of limited economic leverage over the past two decades, U.S. leaders sought 
alternative ways to promote free-market economic ideas in Venezuela. Instead of using 
economic aid to shape policy, U.S. state agencies funded think-tanks and civil society 
organizations focused on lobbying National Assembly members and influencing debate within 
the country. Under the auspices of democracy assistance, the U.S. has funded such groups across 
the world in order to promote the same liberal democratic vision that U.S. leaders possess. 
Democracy assistance is provided by a range of U.S. state agencies, namely the Department of 
State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED) and its associated entities. Among the entities associated with NED is the 
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), which also acts as the international arm of the 
U.S. Chambers of Commerce (Gill 2020). CIPE has as its mandate the promotion of free-market 
capitalist policies across the world, and it remains the one U.S. state agency specifically and 
solely focused on promoting free-market economic ideas abroad. On its website, CIPE plainly 
 
 
asserts that “countries need to build market-oriented and democratic institutions simultaneously, 
as they are essentially two sides of the same coin. Without a functioning market system, 
democracies will remain weak. Likewise, without a democratic process, economic reforms are 
unlikely to succeed.” 
 
Elsewhere, Timothy M. Gill (2020) discusses how amid this situation the U.S. primarily sought 
to promote free-market capitalist policies by continually funding a think tank titled el Centro de 
Divulgación del Conocimiento Económico para la Libertad (CEDICE). Through CIPE, the U.S. 
funded CEDICE to, for example, publish op-eds in newspapers with national distribution 
condemning Chávez government policies, to bring opposition oriented groups together in order 
to devise a political-economic plan, and to host workshops all throughout the country with 
business leaders who opposed the Chávez government (Gill 2020). In addition, CEDICE 
developed policy documents for the opposition in the aftermath of the 2002 coup d’état that 
temporarily deposed Chávez from office. The group sought to bring opposition members 
together – business leaders, church leaders, opposition politicians, who had aligned under the 
heading of the Democratic Coordinator (CD), and to provide them with policy guidance. The 
group commissioned primarily economists to devise policy papers urging neoliberal economic 
policy reforms, such as privatization and trade liberalization, in order to push the country, in their 
view, in the appropriate direction. All the while, the U.S. financed these projects and even 
allocated funding for everything from salaries to offices and computers. Lastly, although the 
documents that Gill used in his analyses do not extend into the present, relatively recent 
investigative reporting has revealed how the U.S. has continued to fund CEDICE (Associated 
Press 7/14/2014). In addition, U.S. agencies like the NED continue to invite and host their 
representatives to Washington for public events. 
 
 
Military Strategies 
 
While Trump has periodically threatened the Venezuelan government with “a military option,” 
U.S. administrations have stopped short so far of militarily intervening in the country. Though 
this might seem a farfetched possibility to some, there is certainly precedent for U.S. military 
intervention in the region, such as in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 (McPherson 2016). 
Short of a military intervention, though, the U.S. has sought to militarily frustrate the country, 
primarily, once again, through sanctions on sales of military arms to the country. This, in turn, 
has pushed the Venezuelan government to ever rely upon Belarus, China, and Russia for arms 
and their periodic servicing and upgrading. Venezuela has aligned so closely with Russia, for 
instance, that the two countries have even engaged in periodic joint military exercises, much to 
the consternation of both the U.S. and neighboring Colombia (Smilde and Gill 2013). 
 
In 2006, under the Bush II administration, the U.S. first sanctioned the Venezuelan government 
with regards to military weapons sales. The State Department’s rationale for the arms sanctions 
included Venezuela’s close relations with Cuba and Iran, their lack of support for anti-terrorism 
efforts, and the claim that they were harboring Colombian terrorist groups, specifically the 
FARC. On the other hand, Chávez criticized the Bush II administration for inciting terrorism 
themselves, especially with regard to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. These sanctions have 
persisted into the present under Trump. 
 
 
 
Outside of banning such sales, the U.S. has also continually worked with Venezuela’s neighbor 
and foe over the past several decades, Colombia. At several points over the last few years, the 
two countries have closed the border and recalled their respective diplomats. Venezuelan 
government leaders have recurrently claimed the U.S. has worked with the Colombian 
government to devise strategies to overthrow their government. On the Colombian end, leaders 
have claimed that the Venezuelan government has assisted or at least given safe haven to FARC 
and ELN members. These claims have continued into the present. At a recent meeting with 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó and Secretary of 
State Pompeo himself asserted that the Venezuelan government continues to host Colombian 
guerilla fighters, in addition to Hezbollah members. Hezbollah remains an organization with ties 
to the Iranian government, which the U.S. has designated as a terrorist group. In the current 
climate, following the assassination of Iranian military leader Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, 
such a linkage could potentially provide a justification for further interventionist tactics, a move 
that Guaidó and other Venezuelan opposition members surely remain aware of. 
 
Although the U.S. has not itself militarily intervened into the country, U.S. leaders have 
encouraged Venezuela’s own military members to rise up against the Maduro government. 
Under Bush II, it has been alleged that U.S. leaders worked with dissident Venezuelan military 
members to overthrow the Venezuelan government, most particularly during the 2002 coup 
(Golinger 2006). And indeed, the U.S. acknowledged that its own Department of Defense had 
previous contact with some of the individuals who participated in the 2002 coup (OIG 2002). 
However, the same U.S. inquiry also found that the Bush administration never encouraged or 
gave any green light to this coup (OIG 2002). The same cannot be said for the Trump 
administration, which has brazenly called upon Venezuelan military leaders to align with the 
opposition and depose the Maduro administration from power. Former National Security Advisor 
John Bolton, for instance, asserted that “Maduro will only use this military support to further 
repress the people of Venezuela; perpetuate the economic crisis that has destroyed Venezuela’s 
economy; and endanger regional stability. We call on the Venezuelan military to uphold its 
constitutional duty to protect the citizens of Venezuela” (White House, 3/29/2019). Pompeo has 
also continually tweeted out similar calls to the Venezuelan military. 
 
What is more, the U.S. has directly worked with opposition leader Juan Guaidó to devise 
schemes in which Venezuelan military members might side with him and the opposition, and 
publicly renounce the Maduro government. In February 2019, for example, USAID set up 
stations alongside the Colombian border with Venezuela and proposed to bring medicine and 
food supplies across the border to assist Venezuelan citizens suffering amid the economic crisis 
facing the country. Given its long history of intervention throughout Latin America and more 
specifically Venezuela (see Political Strategies for a wider discussion of USAID in Venezuela 
over the past two decades), the Maduro government rejected working with USAID. Maduro also 
rejected the U.S.’s attempt to portray itself as a benevolent actor in the region all the while 
enacting sanctions against the government and, in doing so, exacerbating the economic crisis 
(see Economic Strategies above). At the outset of the U.S. announcement, Maduro stated he 
would not allow USAID to bring supplies into the country. In response, Guaidó welcomed the 
supplies and called on supporters to come to the border to help him to bring them into the 
country. The expectation was that this would create a dilemma among military members, who 
 
 
had received orders to prohibit the supplies from entering the country. In the end, although some 
few Venezuelan military members defected from the country, the scheme failed to bring supplies 
into the country, and it failed to cause a serious disruption in state-military relations. Maduro, if 
anyone, ended up looking more powerful. 
  
As the first term of the Trump administration nears its end, U.S. military intervention appears off 
the table. However, we cannot entirely rule out its prospect. Trump is currently preparing for the 
2020 electoral race and has also faced impeachment. His government has assassinated an Iranian 
government leader and heightened tensions with both the Iraqi and Iranian governments. It is 
clear that many in the Venezuelan opposition welcome U.S. military intervention and other 
extra-legal moves to displace Maduro, especially as U.S. political-economic strategies have 
failed to unseat him. There appears little left that the Trump administration can do with regards 
to the country, short of such intervention. Should the Maduro administration imprison Juan 
Guaidó, this might provide justification for intervention. What is more, Guaidó recently traveled 
the world in an effort to draw attention to alleged Hezbollah influence within the country. Hardly 
any serious analyst agrees that Hezbollah maintains any influence or serious presence in 
Venezuela. However, as we saw in Iran, the Trump administration is not averse to taking forceful 
and shocking measures abroad.  
 
 
Political Strategies 
 
Over the past two decades, U.S. administrations have largely combated the Venezuelan 
government on what we might understand as the political terrain. U.S. agencies have funded 
opposition political parties and civil society organizations, U.S. leaders have sought to limit 
Venezuelan participation in global institutions, and U.S. administrations have recurrently 
condemned Venezuelan state policies (Cole 2005; Clement 2007; Gill 2019, 2020; Golinger 
2006). All the while, the Venezuelan government has grown closer with U.S. foes, such as, for 
example, Belarus, China, Iran, and Russia. China and Russia, most specifically, have become 
primary allies of the country – investing in key industries, lending funds for development 
projects, and trading with the country. 
 
Given the lack of economic dependency upon the U.S. and the unwillingness to invade the 
country, the U.S. has predominantly relied upon political strategies to combat the Venezuelan 
government and to enfranchise right-wing political groups in the country. In doing so, U.S. 
democracy promoting agencies have led these efforts, including USAID, and the NED and its 
associated groups, including the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), CIPE, and the Solidarity Center. Before 
Chávez took office, the NED maintained little presence in the country. Following his election, 
however, the Bush II administration substantially increased funding for the organization, and the 
NDI established a field office in the country (Clement 2007; Golinger 2006). Though the IRI 
formerly worked with some youth organizations, both NDI and IRI directed their efforts towards 
bolstering the capabilities of right-wing political parties in the country (Clement 2005; Cole 
2017; Gill 2019; Golinger 2006). In an interview with one IRI contractor, for instance, the 
individual told Gill, one of the authors of this paper, that the purpose of IRI activity in the 
country was to help the opposition “get [their] shit together so they could defeat Chávez” (Gill 
 
 
2019). Putting these activities more formally, the IRI hosted workshops and held presentations in 
order to teach right-wing opposition party leaders from the country’s most prominent center-right 
and right-wing political parties, such as Acción Democratica, Un Nuevo Tiempo, Primero 
Justicia, and Proyecto Venezuela, about how they might best garner voter support, reach out to 
youth voters, develop political platforms, and speak with journalists. The IRI, in addition to U.S. 
diplomatic leaders, also encouraged opposition parties to unify against Chávez and his allies in 
electoral contests so that they might not splinter their votes (Gill 2019). In 2006, for instance, the 
IRI encouraged opposition members to rally around opposition presidential candidate Manuel 
Rosales, from the political party Un Nuevo Tiempo, and even provided him with technical 
specialists to support his campaign. 
 
In more recent years, the IRI, and other state agencies, have linked up with newfound political 
parties Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular. Indeed, current opposition leader and self-
proclaimed president Juan Guaidó remains a member of VP, which also includes additional 
opposition leader Leopoldo López. Though different opposition parties and their members have 
become more prominent than others over the course of the last two decades, opposition leaders 
and parties have generally aligned against Chavez/Maduro policies and the extent of government 
intervention into the economy (Cannon 2014, 2016). Though many in the opposition do not 
believe that the government should be entirely absent from the lives of the citizens, they believe 
that the Socialists have intervened too heavily, and that less intervention into the oil industry, and 
other areas, such as health and education, are required for the Venezuelan economy. The NDI, 
for its part, has also largely linked up with members from many of the same parties that the IRI 
worked with in Venezuela. However, in addition to bolstering the capacities of opposition 
groups, they have also worked on issues of electoral observation. In Serbia, in earlier years, U.S. 
support for groups documenting voter fraud helped bring down the Milosevic government 
(Spoerri 2015). In Venezuela, however, these efforts only served to demonstrate the legitimacy 
of the Chávez government and the fact that he truly received support from a majority of the 
voting population.  
  
Outside of the NED and its associated groups, USAID has worked with groups in the country to 
ultimately depose the Chávez and Maduro governments. Though USAID worked in the country 
in earlier decades during the mid-20th century, they maintained little presence in the country in 
the immediate years before the Chávez government. In the aftermath of the 2002 coup, however, 
the Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) opened an office in the country amid much criticism 
(Golinger 2006). While USAID works in many countries, OTI, a particular unit of USAID, 
operates in often war-torn and conflict-ridden countries, such as Syria and Ukraine. Among the 
projects that USAID/OTI devised and supported included the development of a program 
throughout poor Venezuelan neighborhoods where contractors worked with opposition party 
activists to develop community groups (Gill 2019). Though the groups professed to have a focus 
on vague issues such as community development and participatory democracy, the objective of 
the groups was to put Chávez-supporters into contact with opposition party activists in an effort 
to turn them away from the government. In doing so, these groups organized breakfasts and other 
community events to bring community members out to meet with them, and, subsequently, to put 
them into contact with opposition supporters. The hope was that these supporters might be able 
to incrementally and subtly bring them over to the right-wing opposition. 
 
 
 
Chávez, however, continued to win elections amid this support, and USAID/OTI eventually 
shifted much of its focus towards burgeoning student groups that were in the streets protesting 
against Chávez government policies. Indeed, this is where Juan Guaidó initially got into public 
politics, as he worked within such student groups and together with student group leaders 
protested against the Chávez government. In interviews that Gill (2019) has written about 
elsewhere, USAID/OTI members revealed how they held workshops for right-wing student 
groups and provided supplies for them in order to better disseminate their messages and protest 
against the government. One USAID/OTI contractor referred to such student leaders-turned-
government leaders as her children, demonstrating how strongly some of these individuals felt 
about those they worked with.  
 
Into the present, USAID and the NED and its associated groups continue to finance groups 
within the country. In recent years, U.S.-Venezuela relations have plummeted well beyond what 
existed when Chávez remained in office. As a result, we can be sure that USAID and NED 
continue work with right-wing opposition groups that remain intent on deposing the Venezuelan 
government, namely Guaidó and his allies. Indeed, the Trump administration has been quite 
transparent about its increased funding for Guaidó and his allies. After cutting aid for Central 
American countries, the Trump administration openly redirected this aid towards Guaidó and his 
domestic allies. In doing so, Trump tripled the amount of support provided to him and the 
opposition in the years prior, that is, from $15 million to $52 million. If the U.S. buttressed the 
right-wing opposition through various state agency funding in earlier years, Trump has now went 
all out in his overt financial support for the opposition. 
 
 
Conclusion: Theorizing Regime Change Efforts 
 
U.S. regime change efforts have taken various forms in Venezuela over the past two decades, as 
laid out above. While the U.S. has worked on many fronts, its influence has been limited by the 
global, political-economic positioning of Venezuela. Venezuela has remained a middle-income 
country that has not relied upon foreign aid in the same way that many other countries 
throughout the world have relied upon the U.S. and foreign assistance. In addition, Venezuela 
possesses vast energy resources that much of the world itself relies upon. As a result, U.S. 
economic leverage within the country has remained rather limited. Of course, the U.S. could 
have always cut off trade with the country and/or banned the Venezuelan government from 
profiting from oil sales or any other transactions with U.S. citizens. This latter option was only 
exercised, though, in recent years by the Trump administration, an exceptionally undiplomatic 
administration that has sown chaos in many parts of the world. 
 
Short of military intervention into Venezuela, then, the U.S has largely used political strategies 
to confront the Venezuelan government and the challenge it has posed to U.S. global hegemony. 
In doing so, U.S. state functionaries have worked primarily through democracy promoting 
agencies, such as USAID and the NED, and its associated groups, in order to enhance right-wing 
opposition groups and assist them in potentially defeating the Venezuelan government at the 
ballot box or through extra-legal maneuvers. Through these groups, U.S. state functionaries have 
counseled opposition leaders, hosted workshops assisting them in their campaign efforts, and 
sought to encourage Venezuelan citizens to embrace the opposition. While the opposition has not 
 
 
been without some successes over the past two decades, they have ultimately failed to dislodge 
the socialists from power. 
 
Across U.S. administrations, the main difference between the Bush II/Obama administrations 
and the Trump administration revolves around the primary strategies that the U.S. has embraced 
alongside the right-wing opposition in Venezuela. During the Bush II/Obama years, the 
opposition largely pursued an electoral path to defeat Chávez and Maduro, that is, with the 
exception of the 2002 coup (Cannon 2014). In doing so, these two U.S. administrations 
supported these endeavors as detailed above and provided guidance and funding for the 
opposition. Under the Trump administration, though, the opposition has largely pursued an extra-
legal path towards deposing Maduro, and the Trump administration has been more than willing 
to assist in leading calls for the overthrow of the Venezuelan government. As of September 
2020, Maduro remains in control of the country. Nevertheless, the situation has become all the 
more intense with the rise of COVID-19 and with the U.S. Department of Justice indicting 
Maduro for drug charges and offering a $15 million award for any information leading to his 
arrest. 
 
Indeed, the global, political-economic positioning of Venezuela for most of the past two decades 
explains the U.S. reliance upon political strategies to undermine Venezuela in lieu of primarily 
economic strategies. Yet, the question remains as to why such strategies have yet to depose the 
Socialists. First, both China and Russia have been willing to support the country, and they have 
refused to back down from their support amid U.S. confrontation. There were moments during 
the Cold War, where the Soviet Union aligned with countries challenging the U.S. In some ways, 
then, Russia continues the legacy of the Soviet Union in terms of its support for some countries 
that also challenge U.S. global hegemony. Of course, Russia and its rulers remain motivated by 
far different objectives than Soviet leadership. However, the desire to needle the U.S. and project 
global power remains quite similar.  
 
This is a pattern that we also see with regards to China. Amid U.S. sanctions and criticism of the 
country, the Chinese government has not abandoned Venezuela. There is no doubt that should 
China have desired a political transition in Venezuela, it would be made all the more easy. 
Though Maduro might paint China as a co-participant in an ideological struggle, it is also 
possible that Chinese leaders fear that should the right-wing opposition come to power, they 
might not honor existing deals that the Socialists have made with the country. If that were to 
happen, China might lose some of its preferential access to some of the largest oil supplies in the 
world. Either way, China and Russia have become critical allies that Venezuela has been able to 
economically and militarily count on amid its struggle with the U.S. and its escalating economic 
crisis. 
 
Second, Chávez received the support of the populace throughout his time in office. It is true that 
citizens did not agree with every government move that he took, including a 2007 set of reforms 
that they voted down in a referendum. However, he decisively bested all his opponents in 
presidential elections across fifteen years. Maduro initially benefited from his attachment to 
Chávez and won a presidential election in the wake of his death. However, as the economic crisis 
intensified within Venezuela, it became clear that citizens were unhappy with his style of 
governance. As a result, Maduro jailed political opponents, jailed political protesters, altered the 
 
 
playing field for elections, and removed the possibility of a recall election against him. Taken 
together, Maduro has taken a heavy-handed approach to ensuring that he remains in power. 
 
Finally, not many high-ranking military members or state/government members have defected 
from Maduro. It is true that some citizens have turned against the government, possibly in an 
attempt to ensure they are not jailed by any future opposition government, but these defections 
have been few. Critics assert that the Maduro government has relied upon Cuban support to 
maintain order among the ranks of the military. Some also claim that high-ranking military 
members believe their safest guarantee is to remain close to Maduro, given the possibility of 
prosecution should they defect. Nonetheless, what remains is a military and state that is loyal to 
the Maduro government. Guaidó also currently claims the presidency, but he controls little if 
anything within the country itself. Over the past year, the Trump administration has forcefully 
and overtly sought to depose Maduro. In the last few months, though, he has seemingly come 
around to the fact that, in his words, Maduro remains “a tough cookie.” Amid claims that 
Maduro works with Hezbollah, and with the 2020 election on the horizon, we can be sure that 
Trump has left no option off the table to depose Maduro, including military action. 
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